French: The language of Middle Eastern diplomacy? Thursday, 16 June 2011 03:46

France, so long the regional strongman in the Mediterranean, is adopting the role of a leading power by once again involving itself heavily in Arab and Mediterranean security. The French have shown competence on the battlefield and leadership in the international arena. A successful intervention in Cote d’Ivoire, and a leading role in strategically coordinating air operations against Colonel Gadhafi and his troops in Libya, following skilful diplomacy in the United Nations, attest to this.

A state’s ability to be a player in the international arena depends largely on three things: First, the possession of military power and/or natural and financial resources. Second, the willingness to use these assets effectively to further the national interest. Third, the player in question creates a perception among other states that it is powerful and able. Simply put, to exercise power is to create the perception of power. Once this perception has taken hold, it gives a state the potential to delve into bigger problems, taking on the role of a peacemaker.

Through its recent actions France has affirmed this impression. It possesses an aircraft carrier le Charles-de-Gaulle, two highly modernised amphibious assault vessels le Mistral and le Tonnerre, the world’s second most expansive diplomatic network, and most importantly, an overtly interest centred foreign policy that does not shy away from the use of force if necessary. In this way it has outshone Great Britain and projected power in a way that its one time rival, now ally has found difficult to match.

It is no surprise, therefore, that buoyed by its recent foreign policy successes, France has once more dipped its oar into the most turbulent sea of all, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Peace-making here has always been the preserved domain of the United States, the Quartet being at best a mild irritant for Israel that is publicly humoured but privately ignored. But seeing the inability of the US to move the peace process forward the French have viewed themselves as worthy of filling the gap, and have posited a ‘peace conference’ in Paris this July for the sides to sit down and talk.

The US is sceptical, not necessarily of France’s abilities, but rather of “the willingness of the parties to resume negotiating”. But in truth, the US is in no position to judge, having presided over no successful peace negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians since the Wye River Accords in 1998. Foreign Minister Juppe has struck a more optimistic note, stating that the conference should go ahead, having reassured Secretary Clinton that France has put nothing forward that contradicts the US position.

Indeed, both the Israelis and the Palestinians have indicated their willingness to at least consider the proposals that the French have outlined, and the plan has received public backing from Tony Blair, the envoy to the Quartet. On the Israeli side, hesitancy swirls around two key issues, the inclusion of Hamas in any peace negotiation, and the mention of 1967 borders as the basis of a final status agreement.

However, should international backing for the conference prove sufficient, it will not do for the Israelis to appear publicly reticent about the idea of moving towards peace. The Prime Minister Netanyahu has long stated his ‘desire’ for peace, and to back out of a conference organised to achieve such a goal would be catastrophic PR for his strategy to entice the world to Israel’s side.

The most important question that needs to be asked is of course, can France succeed where others have failed? Received wisdom would seem to indicate that should the peace conference go ahead the chances of success are highly unlikely. Nevertheless, reaching an all-encompassing peace may not be France’s goal. The UN vote on a declaration of Palestinian Statehood is scheduled for September. By initiating talks between the two sides the French may be able to point to movement in the Israeli Palestinian question, thereby opening new possibilities for both sides to explore ahead of a potentially uncompromising Israeli defeat in the UN. The move is important because a UN declaration of Statehood carries a high risk of increasing tension in the region, to the extent that it may be the progenitor of a third intifada. Surely neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians would wish to see more needless loss of life. The French move is therefore an essential, if only hopeful step toward calming the turbulent air, and they have shown more creativity, more guile and more belief than the US in helping to achieve this goal.

The history of French involvement in the Middle East is chequered, marked by occupation, and a deeply troubled past. Nevertheless, France’s turning its attention to the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean should be welcomed, for it has shown an ability to deliver in regions where other powers have feared to tread.

It may be the case that the peace conference will end in failure. It may be that President Sarkozy is using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to gain domestic political capital in an election season. But the French have provided an outlet that has the potential to prevent the region from descent into yet another bloody episode. Surely it can be agreed that this is a positive development.

The peninsula